Monday, November 29, 2010

Ireland's failure, the rise of the eurogroup, and Iceland's revenge

Ireland's caretaker government (the governing coalition collapsed as a consequence of the crisis) has accepted an emergency loan from the EU and the IMF worth 85 billion euros. As I predicted in my last post, Ireland is stressing that the money will go to the banks, either directly (45 billion in immediate aid) or indirectly (to cover banking losses that the government converted earlier into public debt).

At the end of the day, Ireland needed cash, and the UK promises of up to 8 billion euros (7 billion pounds) proved too small to be useful.

One element that Irish prime minister Brian Cowen has stressed from beginning to end is that Irish sovereignty will remain intact. The main issue he is concerned about is keeping the Irish corporate tax rate of 12.5 per cent that has brought so many companies to Ireland, and that has won Ireland a lot of hostility from the European continent. Now that the financial service industry has bottomed out, the last thing Ireland wants is the multinationals that moved to Ireland in recent years to pack up shop and leave. There is already an exodus from London toward Geneva and other ports, and Ireland doesn't want to be next.

Three additional points of this deal are worth noting. First, at the same time that the EU and the IMF are providing assistance to Irish banks, whether directly or indirectly, Ireland is raiding the national pension fund of 17 billion euros to ensure that the amount borrowed isn't even greater. This is a matter of grave importance for Ireland's future, as pension funds worldwide have been hit very badly by the double whammy of demographics and  the decline of pension portfolios as a result of the crisis. This is the perfect example of what economists call time inconsistency...and what the rest of us would call borrowing money today and never keeping the promise to pay it back. Because there never is a good time.

This point has been critical in bringing the Irish out into the streets in protest. Why should they pay for bad bets by Irish banks?

Second, Iceland has had it's moment of sweet revenge and has underlined that the Irish government is making a clear choice to subsidise bankers at the expense of the general populace Iceland's President Olafur Grimsson commented this week that his country doesn't have debt like Ireland because it let the banks fail and didn't guarantee bank failures with public money. This will surely prove to be a wiser choice than Ireland's.

Third, this deal was decided by the finance ministers of the eurogroup, who met on Sunday evening to finalise the deal with Ireland. Although it is sensible for these countries to have a formal role in euro zone matters, they do not, primarily because the UK has opposed it since before the euro existed. Instead, it is formally ECOFIN, the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers of the EU, which has this power.
 
What is happening and why is it so important? The euro zone, not the EU per se, is putting up the money to save its weaker members, and so it stands to reason that its ministers must meet to approve loans. This means that ECOFIN's role within the EU has been sidelined in an important policy area, and that attempts to keep the eurogroup down as a fact of life have failed.

The new EU, which is in the process of forming, will have to find room to accommodate this new reality.

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

The Irish Crisis

How it must hurt to be Irish right now.

Bond markets have been sending clear signals that lending to Ireland is a risky endeavour, that the risk of default is rising. Dublin must offer 665 basis points more for 10-year bonds than Berlin does, an astronomical 6.65 percent. The Republic of Ireland took on debt in 2008/2009 to assist its massive banking sector and prevent it from collapsing. Debts were transferred from the private sector to the public sector, with the consequence that swingeing cuts in public spending have been necessary, and the capacity to borrow when needed has shrunk.

Ireland is on the brink of being a developing country once again. And its government is looking for a way to avert catastrophe without resorting to a public bailout from Europe and the IMF under the auspices of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).

As a result, Irish Finance Minister Brian Lenihan is seeking a bailout that would go directly to banks and not the government, saving the government the shame and humiliation of publicly receiving what amounts to institutionalised development assistance. If Lenihan is successful, he will secure an enormous state aid programme for the Irish financial sector. This would be ground-breaking (an EU facility to bail out private companies in addition to national governments),  expensive (no programme like this is restricted to a single recipient in EU politics), precedent-setting (other countries would line up for handouts if the Irish package were approved), and a massive violation of EU rules against public subsidy of private companies. All of which are reasons why it shouldn't happen. The EU has already broken rules on providing subsidies to banks in the financial crisis,. but until now it has been national governments who have been providing the cash injections.


It appears that Ireland's rescue may come from the country that sees itself as next to be torpedoed if the Irish ship sinks: the United Kingdom. This offer is for bilateral aid from London to Dublin, bypassing the EU and the EFSF, and possibly subsidising the banks directly in a way that would not set European precedents. In doing so, London is also keen to discredit the EFSF, which it has allowed to be set up but refuses to actively support. London stated today that whatever bailout plans Europe might offer would be too little and too late, and that national action was imperative and right.

UK Chancellor George Osborne today underlined the UK national interest in underwriting Ireland's survival and ensuring that Dublin can hold to its present course of budget cutbacks and structural reforms to the economy. That interest is not only based on the similar economic profiles of Ireland and the UK, including a distinctive reliance on low taxes, light regulation and a strong financial services sector. He sees the UK and Ireland as ideological comrades on the fringe of Europe, and he is right. The Conservative/Liberal Democratic government in the UK is also intent on preserving national sovereignty and inflicting massive budget cuts on the UK economy. Universities will have their funding cut by 80%, and welfare cuts are pending.

In Dublin Castle, there are portraits of James Connolly and other martyrs of the Easter Rising of 1916. It is there, looking into the faces of these men long gone, and listening to a tour guide explain how the British rounded them up and executed them, strapping Connolly to a chair to shoot him because he was too ill to stand, that you begin to understand just what it means for Ireland to have Britain as its only hope. Lenihan hasn't rejected this offer as he has rejected EU and IMF aid. He and the Irish government will take it if it will avoid the shame of institutionalised aid to the Irish government. Because the Irish Crisis isn't simply economic. The whole country is on the line.

That's how much is at stake.

Monday, November 15, 2010

The New Politics of Economic Aid

How quickly and thoroughly times change

Recently, EU governments bellyached about establishing the European Financial Stability Facility. Now they, especially Germany, want to force it on unwilling recipients. What is going on and why?

Ireland is allegedly under pressure to accept money from the fund. Why would it resist? Accepting money from the fund is politically equivalent to accepting money from the IMF. The money handed over is enveloped with the stench of political failure, both at home, and internationally. In the latter case, the country's entire economic philosophy comes under attack.

Ireland has a history of strongly defending national sovereignty when it feels that the EU has gone too far in the demands it makes on national economic policy. Throughout the 2000s, the European Commission made regular demands that Ireland rein in its overheating economy with tax increases and restrictions on public spending. It did this in the context of annual economic reviews contained in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). The Commission wanted every country in the EU to have the same levels of growth and inflation, and tried to use the BEPG to expand its power from countries with huge budget deficits (where there are indeed rules) to countries like Ireland, where there are no such rules. Ireland, as a typical catch-up country, had higher growth and inflation levels than more established economies, and underlined its continued sovereignty over economic policy. It is not about to let that principle go down without a fight. Aid always comes with strings attached that Dublin has always rejected in principle.

Beyond this constitutional angle on accepting, rejecting or demanding use of the Facility's aid, there are strong ideological principles at stake with regard to choosing Ireland. Ireland has seen itself since the 2000s in particular as living proof that market forces are the best means of economic and social development. It benefited greatly from foreign investment into the country during the last decade, and is holding true to the creed of market first by drastically cutting public borrowing, spending and wages, so that private capital will return to Ireland. If it succeeds, it will bolster those who insist that structural adjustment policies in Europe must be radically strengthened to ensure higher levels of economic growth and employment.

It will correspondingly weaken the other camp, which has chosen to make financial market participants at least partially responsible for the financial and economic crisis, which wants to see a number of regulations and restrictions on their activity imposed, and which wants to leave social security nets left largely intact. The name of this game is not adjustment, but stabilisation and prudential regulation

And to make that work, it would be best for that camp to lure, or cajole Ireland down the other path.

Friday, November 12, 2010

Paying for the euro

Who pays when the euro gets into trouble? Almost everyone, it seems, but in different ways. After the euro's inception, low-inflation countries like Germany, the Benelux countries, Austria and Finland, suffered interest rates that were far too high for them as the European Central Bank fought higher rates of inflation in Spain, Portugal Italy, Ireland and Greece.

The possibility of a Greek government default has changed the cost of euro zone membership permanently. By June 2010, the German government had gang-pressed all 16 member states in the euro zone into contributing two-thirds of contributions to a new European Financial Stability Fund, which would be topped up by the IMF to reach a total of 750 billion euros. If anyone doubted whether these contributions were voluntary, they were dispelled by a vitriolic attack on Slovakia by the German government when the Parliament in Bratislava refused to ratify the Slovakian commitment. So we now have the first principle of who pays for the euro: all the member states do. (Instead of Greece and similar countries paying by being forced to leave). But for how long will countries that are in better shape have to foot the bill for their weaker and less disciplined neighbours?

Permanently, it seems. In November, France and Germany reached agreement on making the Stability Fund permanent rather than temporary. Both of them were aware that competitive devaluations of countries being forced out of the euro would hurt them, and that pressure on the weakest links of the euro zone would continue as long as the Stability Fund remained temporary. The result is that the no bail-out clause of the EU Treaties, which states that countries will not be held responsible for the debts of their neighbours, will have to be re-negotiated. To prevent further domestic backlash, expect German governments to bolster their credentials as economic conservatives by exerting sustained pressure on high-debt countries to reform their finances. This will be a long-standing feature of European macroeconomic policy for a long time to come.

The agreement also shows the primacy of Franco-German deals on the foundations of Europe's economic constitution, and not the efforts of other actors. Germany and the Commission both entered talks to make the Fund permanent demanding automatic sanctions on deficit sinners, only to be blocked by Paris, which insisted on a measure of political discretion that typifies the Excessive Deficit Procedure that currently applies to euro zone members. Greater institutionalised pressure will be brought to bear on countries like Greece, but because of powerful countries pushing for it. Not because of any autonomous power of European rules and institutions. Herman van Rompuy, the new President of the European Council, in whom pro-Europeans placed so much hope to promote coherent European government in the Council, found himself and his plans for automatic sanctions sidelined by traditional Franco-German summit that was presented to the rest of the Union as a fait accompli.

Fiscal conservatives can relish in the fact that countries like Greece will pay a price, however. That price is to bond markets, which are waking up and charging all of southern Europe and Ireland more to borrow than other euro zone countries.

Regulating Hedge Funds

The European Parliament passed yesterday a directive to regulate hedge funds, officially known as the Alternative Investment Fund Management (AIFM) Directive. The directive requires hedge funds and private equity funds to register with statutory regulators and provide basic information about their activities for the first time.

The AIFM Directive is Europe's interpretation of global principles of hedge fund regulation set out on 22 June 2009 by IOSCO, the International Organisation of Securities Exchange Commissions. Those principles require registration, reporting and require banks lending money to hedge funds (known in the business as hedge fund counterparties) to review the riskiness of providing the leverage that they do.

Hedge funds attracted investors before the financial crisis and criticism during the financial crisis because they make money by speculating on market trends, and then 'leveraging' the cash on hand they have from investors with loans picked up at low cost from Japan (this practice of shopping around for loans across currencies is known as a carry trade) and engaging in short selling. Although hedge funds were not responsible for the banking practices that led to the financial crisis, they actively bet against the financial institutions and instruments that did, hastening the speed and intensity of banking collapses in 2008, and making enormous profits doing so. At certain points during the crisis, trading extended into naked shorting, which was then criminalised in some jurisdictions.

The AIFM Directive had a bumpy ride through legislation. It passed the Council the first time only by virtue of the UK changing from a Labour to a Conservative government, which then fought hard to ensure that American hedge funds, many of which have offices in London, would have equal access to the financial markets of all EU member states based on the regulations prevailing in their EU bridgehead. The UK therefore agreed to accept hedge fund registry if it could effectively retain the light-handed approach to financial market regulation for which it is known.

The deal has been struck.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

The new architecture of financial market regulation

The European Union now has three new Supervisory Authorities with the responsibility of regulating financial markets (in distinct areas), and two new bodies responsible for managing the grand task of systemic risk.

The European Parliament voted on 22 September 2010 to establish the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. Each of these bodies is restricted to regulating the type of financial market activity for which it is specialised. They are then brought together into the European System of Financial Supervisors, which bridges the gaps between the sectors.

Finally, the European Systemic Risk Board is responsible for actively seeking out weak links in the system, like a pig looking for truffles. Stress testing is one of their principal responsibilities, which includes deciding where to look hardest for problems. In this body, the three Supervisory Authorities are brought together with the European Central Bank to assess risk and to issue warnings and recommendations.

Interestingly, the EU has chosen to adopt a set of colour-coded risk statements, much like the United States developed for terrorism threats after 2001. Are financial market participants the new terrorists of the 2010s? Perhaps in the eyes of some Members of European Parliament, who were behind this innovation.

Also of note is that these institutional developments mirror and depend on developments globally and in the United States. The Financial Stability Board is the global equivalent of the ESRB, whilst the Financial Stability Oversight Council is Europe's equivalent in the United States. This means that Europe has created the institutional capacity to coordinated with the rest of the world in not only responding to, but in defining our understanding of systemic risk and in global regulatory standards.

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

The Euro and the Financial Crisis

The euro, Europe's single currency, came under intense scrutiny in 2010. Greece came dangerously close to defaulting on its public debt, financial markets speculated on the country being ejected from the euro as well as other mediterranean countries, the EU established a European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM), later dubbed the European Financial Stability Facility, in response to provide loans to Greece (or any other country needing loans). Greece ended up subject to intense budgetary scrutiny and cutback demands from both the IMF, which topped up the ESM, under the EU's Excessive Deficit Procedure.

Despite all of this, the euro has been a blessing to the EU. There have been no repeats of currency volatility of the kind Europe experienced regularly in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

Also clear is that the EU's deficit rules don't enforce themselves. They are being enforced at the insistence of Germany, which has led the drive to tighten the screws on Greece, to corral the member states of the euro zone into paying for the ESM, to harangue Slovakia for threatening not to pay into the EFSF, and to insist that the Greece be made an example of.

The reason Germany is taking the hard line? German public support for the euro is low. And anger at Chancellor Merkel for organising the Greek bailout is high. It has cost her party control over the large state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, and her party's majority in the German parliament's upper house.