Grexit, Grimbo, Brexit and Kicking Countries out of International Organizations

The European Union is in trouble. One of its most confrontational and egotistical member states has finally isolated itself so badly inside the euro zone and the EU that the relationship with its fellow member states has been damaged beyond repair. Although it might reasonably be argued, as the Tsipras government does, that the rules of membership in the euro zone are unreasonable and require revision, it is another matter to expect that Greece can continue to remain a member and refuse to abide by the rules. Euro zone membership involves relinquishing a good deal of sovereignty. Greece refuses to accept this, and its unwillingness to accept the price of cooperation is not only a problem for the Greeks, but for the euro zone, and the EU as a whole. Current thinking has moved on from Grexit, in which Greece would either leave the single currency voluntarily (which it won't) or be forced out (for which there is no legal precedent) to Grimbo, in which Greece defaults on debt and membership obligations without leaving the organization.

Europe can escape this trap by developing the equivalent of divorce in international relations. Like divorce,  it should neither bring up the topic nor take action lightly, but divorce for actors who have grown apart is a legitimate and helpful alternative to stalemate and the prospect of never-ending conflict. For all of the negative connotations, and despite the fact that one party often does not want it to happen, divorce opens the door to each of the parties making its own choices, making its own mistakes, and learning its own lessons. Europe can and should discuss whether it should eject a member state from the euro zone, and (apart from the euro zone aspect) from the EU entirely. It should not be only up to one partner to decide whether they want to end the relationship. True self-actualization, for good or for bad, requires the power to choose for oneself. That is as true for an individual state as it is for a group of them that want to pursue something special.

Those who oppose the idea might have two arguments--that there is no legal basis for international divorce, and that the alternative is anarchy, which is far worse than committing the members of an organization to a future of unending conflict. But these arguments are misguided. The power of international organizations to do things is claimed as much as inherited by precedent. Yes, the euro zone ejecting Greece, or the EU ejecting the UK, or the UN ejecting a rogue state breaks with tradition. But tradition does not a good life make, and traditions were once decisions. True power over one's own destiny lies in taking those decisions, in acting to shape one's future.

The argument that international divorce promotes anarchy is also misguided and incomplete. It assumes that the status quo is institutionalized relations between consenting states in the absence of outright coercion. But institutions need to adjust to the realities of those they are designed to serve, or anarchy takes over anyway. The reality of the euro zone are that it increasingly reflects the dominance of one state over the others, based on a particular view of right and wrong, of what the organization and its member states are there to do, and what it takes to be a member in good standing. It also uses international agreements outside the EU to buttress the demands of its most powerful member. Greece disagrees, and continued membership serves no one well. So it will find ways to further undermine the institutional order of the euro zone, as discussions of a new drachma alongside the euro and defiance against EMU budget rules underline. The euro zone, and the EU as a whole will suffer more damage to their integrity and waste more of their respective futures if this happens. 

Power politics and financial stability in Europe.

I've just published an article outlining why Europe is having such a hard time getting out of the euro zone crisis and providing for financial stability. It also points to a monumental shift in the willingness of powerful EU states to terminate the sovereignty of their weaker neighbors. Power politics in Europe and their impact on financial stability here: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.2013.801021

European Semester Officer

The Netherlands proposed an EU Super-Commissioner for Budgetary Discipline in 2011 that would control the budgets of the member states as a way of stabilizing the euro zone, and rules to expel members who didn't implement austerity swiftly and effectively in a downturn. Germany liked it, France and the UK hated it, and the idea went away. Or so it seemed.

This morning, the new head of the euro group, Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, announced that the European Commission will install a so-called European Semester Officer in The Hague. The Semester Officer is intended to act as a watchdog over the national governments, without the status of a Commissioner. Legislation and treaty changes are not required. At the moment this post was written, news had not been reflected in the English speaking press. Jean-Luc Annaert, a Belgian, is said to be the first appointee.

Officially, the European Semester is part of an attempt to more strongly link economic policies in the fields of structural adjustment (competitiveness policy, known as Europe 2020) and euro zone commitments, for all member states) with tougher oversight and sanctioning mechanisms.

The Single Supervisor Mechanism is not a Banking Union

The EU member states have just reached a deal to grant the ECB oversight of roughly 200 EU banks. That is a small fraction of the roughly 6000 that would have been supervised under the original plan that the Commission proposed.

The most important features are still to be determined, but the ECB has stated clearly that it would require extensive powers to make the project work. For the goal, as far as the ECB is concerned was to establish some type of banking union that would mean forced mergers and takeovers, the power to take away ownership rights from shareholders (some of who are member states themselves), engage in other forms of strenuous intervention, and be responsible for all banks, getting beyond the myth that only large institutions can cause systemic failure.

The agreement in principle this morning is not yet a banking union. There will be further international negotiations that appear fated to water down the powers even further than they have been already, and the legal challenges have already been flagged.

Germany limits the European Stability Mechanism

Germany's consitutional court ruled today that Germany may participate in the European Stability Mechanism, but with strict limits and conditions. The ESM is the permanent fund meant to prop up finances in some of the euro zone's countries.

Condition one is a cap on Germany's contribution at 190 billion euros. No salami tactics in which the commitment becomes larger.

Condition two is full consultation with the German parliament on an ongoing basis. This means the terms of the loans and the compliance with the terms.

Condition three is a new treaty to write those conditions down. Even a modification of the existing treaty is a new one, so that is clear.

These conditions mean that those opposed to the ESM's establishment will not get their way entirely. But they will have it in their power to make the recipients of ESM funds wish they had. Those in Germany that want to cut off Southern Europe entirely will have to settle for cutting them down to size. They will now have the tools do so with all their might. And Europe will suffer again.

Reading on Debt and Rescues

I was reading today on debt crises and rescue packages and thought--most of what we have had written in the past has been about debt crises in developing countries, or as they are more congenially known these days--emerging markets. Two of those I've been reading today are 'The political economy of the Bretton Woods institutions', by C. Randall Henning and another of his works: The Exchange Stabilization Fund: slush fund or war chest?  The first provides a nice history of how the IMF and World Bank developed and changed alongside private finance. As part of that history, you'll get to read how debt crises arose in Mexico particularly, and were dealt with periodically by the American government and the two Bretton Woods institutions. You'll also get to read how, after those crises, the bulk of finance to Latin America shifted from investment in bonds to investment in stock markets, and direct investment. Bond holding shifted elsewhere, particularly Europe, which is why someone ought to write about how those two eras are different.

One obvious difference is the absence of a US Government interest in funding a rescue plan. That's something one can understand, too. The United States has enough problems of its own, and money is funnelled much more easily through the IMF these days from the countries that have it.

The second work looks at the degree of discretion that the President of the United States has to spend money on stabilising the exchange rate and the international monetary system. There are some clues there to constructing a mechanism within Europe to distribute money where its needed, because it looks at the relationship between the executive branch and Congress, of how accountability could be infused into a European mechanism for sorting its internal financial affairs.

The fact that Europe now falls into a literature applied to less prosperous countries underlines a few lessons for international political economy, and comparative politics as well. The first is that advanced and emerging market countries are plagued these days by much the same problems, and should not be treated separately. That's arrogant and presuming and passe.

The second is that it should renew our interest, if it's not already sparked, in long-term decline of advanced economy countries, and the responses to that threat. There is a history of such writing on the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s that emphasised strong states as exacerbating decline and strong markets as reversing it. Those messages are already being reversed in contemporary analysis that looks at the crisis generally, but how does the return of the state translate into analysing Europe's choices during the current crisis? How strongly do state intervention, (neo)Keynesian economics and international cooperation factor in giving Europe a chance to deleverage without destroying the economy? Does Europe possess sufficient political coherence and direction to construct a rescue package that compensates for the lack of a European government? Is Europe's economic constitution preventing Europe from recovering?

These are questions that affect us all, and the answers look unfavourable unless Europe changes course.